Every one who has thought on the subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can be collected in any country, by direct taxe[s], when the foederal government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to support their governments. Without money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle away, and, as before observed, their powers absorbed in that of the general government.
It might be here shewn, that the power in the federal legislative, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and their controul over the militia, tend, not only to a consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty. The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution.
One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each state at least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts.
These courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the states, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states. How far the clause in the 8th section of the Ist article may operate to do away all idea of confederated states, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general government, it is impossible to say.
The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures.
Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the state debt, may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the United States? For all laws made, in pursuance of this constitution, are the supreme lay of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an individual state, further than they are less responsible to the people.
But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government.
And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way.
This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all.
It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation.
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people.
The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the baron de Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected. History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans.
Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.
Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law.
In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one.
In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion concerning it.
In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind. In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed.
This is the true criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the whole, expressed in any manner they may agree upon; the latter by the will of one, or a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the choice and the number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and consequently qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know, or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few.
Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldly, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government. The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number.
Various questions are raised after he assassinates Caesar. One such question happens to be based on the light of his friendship with Caesar and whether the assassination is a noble act of selflessness or a callous evil act. One also wonders whether the act has happened as a result of foul indifference to the ties of friendship and failure to be moved by Caesar's power.
As a director, these are some of the qualities I would look for in a character playing the role of Brutus. The character acting this role ought to be idealistic. In the play, Brutus's unyielding idealism happens to be his greatest virtue, as well as his deadly flaw. Brutus could be viewed as a noble Roman citizen whose self ambitions do not dominate other motivations Shakespeare Despite the fact that Caesar happens to be a very close to him, Brutus chooses Rome over friendship. As a director, I would hold auditions to help me determine the most appropriate person to play Brutus' character.
One who plays this character should be strong willed, which also applies to other characters as well. Brutus seems to have naive idealism as shown in several instances. His commitment to the course leads to various miscalculations. In an effort to curtail violence, he ignores the advice given by Cassius to allow the conspirators to kill Antony Shakespeare He disregards Cassius once more by allowing him to speak at Caesar's funeral.
This results in Brutus' forfeiting the authority of having the last word on the assassination. Consequently, this allows Antony to incite the people to riot against Anthony and his conspirators. The character of Brutus should also appear confused.
This would go in line with the part of Brutus who seems to be torn between his love for Rome and his love for Caesar.
He admits to having been at war with himself to Cassius. His confusion allows Cassius to sway him and encourage him to join in the assassination scheme against Caesar Shakespeare He falls into Cassius' trap without realizing that Cassius was acting out of jealousy. Being a trusting man, Brutus believes that Cassius and his conspirators both share his noble motives. We'll occasionally send you account related and promo emails. With a hour delay you will have to wait for 24 hours due to heavy workload and high demand - for free.
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19 rows · The essays were widely reprinted and commented on throughout the American states. The author is thought by most scholars to have been Robert Yates, a New York judge, delegate to the Federal Convention, and political ally of anti-federalist New York Governor George Clinton. All of the essays were addressed to "the Citizens of the State of New York".
Julius Caesar Essay: The Character of Brutus - The Character of Brutus in Julius Caesar “Et tu Brute?” Caesar’s simple statement sums up Brutus’ round character in .
Brutus as the Tragic Hero of Julius Caesar Shakespeare’s tragedy, Julius Caesar, displays Brutus as a tragic hero, blinded loyalty and devotion. Brutus's heroic belief of honor and virtue was so powerful that it drove him to perform villainous actions and lead to his destruction. I 18 October To the Citizens of the State of New-York. When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested in the result.
Julius Caesar - BRUTUS In William Shakespeare's play, Julius Caesar was a tragedy that is mainly based on the assassination of Julius Caesar. The character that was in charge of the assassination was Marcus Brutus 3 / Julius Caesar Brutus was a close friend to Caesar. He had a good relationship with him and an even better one with Rome. Antony VS Brutus Essay Sample. The conspirators depended on Marcus Brutus for one reason: to justify the murder of Julius Caesar. However after allowing Mark Antony to not only bring in the corpse of their beloved Caesar yet also speak after Brutus during the funeral, it would seem that Brutus’ role in the murder was pointless.